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Bankruptcy Regime?
Recently the debate on the reform of the international ﬁnancial archi-
tecture has centered on the development of an appropriate mechanism or
regime to ensure orderly sovereign debt restructurings. Recent cases
involving sovereign bonded debt restructuring (those of Ecuador, Pak-
istan, Russia, and Ukraine) have been successfully completed with the use
of unilateral debt exchange offers (complemented by a system of carrots
and sticks, such as exit consents, to ensure successful deals). But many
observers have expressed dissatisfaction with this “market-based” status
quo approach. The IMF has proposed the creation of an international debt
restructuring mechanism that would have many of the features of an inter-
national bankruptcy regime.1 The papers by Jeremy Bulow, Jeffrey Sachs,
and Michelle White are all interesting contributions to this debate.2 All
address the question of whether we need an institutional change in the
international ﬁnancial system that would lead to a new way of providing
for orderly sovereign debt restructurings or workouts when they become
necessary.
The policy question to be addressed, then, is the following: when sov-
ereign debt restructuring or debt reduction becomes unavoidable, what is
the appropriate regime that provides for an orderly restructuring while
safeguarding the balance of rights of both the creditors and the debtor? Is
it better to continue with the market-based status quo regime and the use
of exchange offers? Should we instead move to the wholesale introduc-
tion of collective action clauses (CACs) in bond contracts (also
described as the “contractual approach”)?3 Or should we consider creat-
ing an international bankruptcy mechanism (a “statutory approach”) like
that proposed by the IMF? Two caveats are in order here. First, the very
concept of insolvency is problematic in the sovereign context, because a
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1. Krueger (2002).
2. Sachs (1995) was an early advocate of an international bankruptcy court for sover-
eign debtors, although his contribution to this symposium concentrates on the debt crisis
and the debt reduction needs of low-income countries. 
3. This approach has been supported by some academics (Eichengreen, 1999) and by
the U.S. administration (Taylor, 2002).
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from its unwillingness to pay. And second, the assessment of the sustain-
ability of a country’s debt is always probabilistic, because a sharp adjust-
ment to the primary ﬁscal balance could in principle make an
unsustainable debt path sustainable. These caveats notwithstanding, there
is a general consensus that, in cases of sovereign “insolvency,” further
ofﬁcial ﬁnance is not warranted and the sovereign should suspend debt
payments and restructure or reduce its debts, while at the same time
undertaking serious and credible domestic ﬁscal adjustment and structural
economic reform.4
Each of these three approaches just described—the status quo
approach, the contractual approach, and the statutory approach—has its
pros and cons. One way to think about their relative merits begins by ask-
ing what are the market failures that may prevent an orderly and efﬁcient
restructuring of sovereign debt when such a restructuring would be bene-
ﬁcial to both debtors and creditors. Several types of externalities might
prevent such a restructuring, but three are crucial and have to do with col-
lective action problems among creditors.5
The ﬁrst is the “rush to the exits.” As a sovereign debt crisis unfolds,
many creditors may try to liquidate their claims at the same time, causing
a disorderly crisis that has real and avoidable costs. An example is that of
liquidity or rollover runs, in which investors become unwilling to roll
over maturing short-term government debt (such as the Mexican teso-
bonos) or short-term cross-border interbank lines of credit (such as in the
East Asian crisis). As I will argue below, a debt suspension or standstill
(including capital controls, freezes on bank deposits, or both) may avoid
such destructive behavior.
The second externality is the “rush to the courthouse” or “grab race.”
Although a unilateral debt standstill may overcome the inefﬁciencies of a
rush to the exits, creditors may instead initiate litigation to recover their
claims. This externality can become a serious problem if creditors can
attach the debtor’s assets. As discussed below, however, there are impor-
tant differences between corporate and sovereign debt on this matter, in
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4. The issue remains open whether a debt workout regime should also be used to solve
liquidity crises and cases where debt restructuring may be necessary but the country is not
clearly insolvent. 
5. Elsewhere (Roubini, 2002) I discuss other potential market failures besides those
analyzed here.
0675-08 BPEA/Roubini  7/22/02  1:12 PM  Page 322that the ability of creditors to seize or attach sovereign assets is very
limited.
The third externality is the “free rider” problem (also called the “hold-
out” or “rogue creditor” problem). In situations where initiatives to
restructure debt require unanimity among the creditors, minority holdout
creditors may scuttle a restructuring even though it is advantageous to the
majority. Although exchange offers may sidestep the unanimity problem,
the holdout problem may remain serious. If a holdout creditor can choose
not to accept the offer and then, through later litigation, receive the full
amount of its claim while those who accepted the offer receive less, a
strong incentive arises for creditors to hold out. If this creditor coordina-
tion problem cannot be solved, a disorderly workout will result, even if a
cooperative solution would be in the interest of all creditors. Thus making
a restructuring plan approved by a majority of creditors binding on all
creditors (through a “cramdown” or majority enforcement provision)
would solve this externality.
In addition to these three collective action problems among creditors,
any efﬁcient mechanism has to deal with a fourth potential market failure
on the side of the debtor, namely, the “rush to default.” This refers to a
debtor’s incentive to default opportunistically. As already noted, and as
the literature on sovereign debt suggests, a sovereign’s decision to default
may be due not to inability to pay but to unwillingness to pay. Oppor-
tunistic defaults are always a possibility, given that a sovereign beneﬁts
from signiﬁcant (but not complete) sovereign immunity, and thus attach-
ing or seizing its assets is difﬁcult. Therefore an efﬁcient international
debt workout mechanism needs to trade off two objectives. On the one
hand, it must avoid making workouts too costly, because default may at
times be due to inability to pay, and restructuring can thus beneﬁt both the
debtor and its creditors. On the other, it must not make workouts too easy,
because otherwise the temptation to default opportunistically may
increase. I will ﬁrst analyze how each of the three regimes being consid-
ered addresses the three collective action problems on the creditor side,
and then consider the question of the rush to default. 
Supporters of a new statutory regime—an international bankruptcy
mechanism—stress the fact that, although the collective action problems
have always existed, they have become more severe in recent years given
developments in international financial markets. In the 1980s most
sovereign debt was held in the form of medium- to long-term syndicated
Nouriel Roubini 323
0675-08 BPEA/Roubini  7/22/02  1:12 PM  Page 323bank loans; the covenants in these loans included sharing clauses and
other limits to the initiation of litigation that made the rush to the court-
house less of a problem. They also had implicit or explicit majority
clauses for dealing with holdout banks. Finally, there was the potential
for moral suasion, as repeated interaction among the banks built up rela-
tionships that made it easier for the leading banks to dissuade others
from holding out. In the 1990s, however, most of the capital flows to
emerging-market sovereigns began to take the form of bonds. The num-
ber, heterogeneity, and divergent interests of this wider group of credi-
tors made the holdout problem much more severe. And the emergence of
new, bondholding creditors with no ongoing relationships with the
debtor or other creditors suggests that the presence of aggressive hold-
outs, or “vulture” creditors, willing to aggressively pursue their claims in
court, may have increased.
In summary, the variety of claims (bank loans of various maturities,
different types of bonds under different legal jurisdictions and with or
without collective action clauses) and of types of creditors (retail
investors, investment and commercial banks, diversiﬁed pension and
mutual funds, hedge funds and other highly leveraged and aggressive
creditors, dedicated emerging-market funds) raises a difﬁcult collective
action problem of coordinating the interests and actions of these heteroge-
neous claims and claimants. Investors may rush to the exits in a destruc-
tive panic; they may rush to the courthouse and start litigation if the
debtor suspends payments; and they may hold out even if a majority of
creditors could reach an agreement advantageous to all. 
If this view is correct, a new international bankruptcy mechanism
could allow for a more orderly restructuring. It would solve the three col-
lective action problems in the following ways. First, it would allow the
imposition of a suspension of debt payments and thus stop the rush to the
exits. Second, it would impose a stay of litigation following the debt sus-
pension that would be legally binding on all creditors and thus prevent
disruptive litigation. And third, it would allow for a majority vote on a
restructuring agreement that is binding on all creditors, thus eliminating
the free rider problem.
Supporters of the contractual approach argue that most of the beneﬁts
of the statutory approach could be achieved through the more widespread
use of collective action clauses. Such clauses usually do not allow indi-
vidual bondholders to start litigation, but instead require that litigation be
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that reduce the beneﬁts of holding out and litigating. Also, CACs gener-
ally include majority cramdown provisions, so that an agreement reached
by a majority of creditors can be made binding on all holdouts, thus solv-
ing the free rider problem. Thus, according to their proponents, CACs
could solve the collective action problems that prevent an orderly restruc-
turing. And, compared with an international bankruptcy regime that
could give new judicial powers to the IMF or a newly established bank-
ruptcy court, this contractual solution could be more market friendly,
relying only on agreements reached between the sovereign debtor and its
creditors. 
It is worth noting that the sovereign debt restructuring regime proposed
by the IMF, at least its latest, “IMF-lite” version,6 would not be substan-
tially different from a contractual approach, as it would be creditor cen-
tered rather than IMF centered or bankruptcy court centered. This
proposal would give creditors all the rights related to approving, by
majority vote, an initial stay of litigation (and its continuation) and the
eventual restructuring deal, which would be binding on minority holdout
creditors.
Supporters of the statutory approach would argue that their solution is
superior to a contractual regime for several reasons. First, there is a tran-
sition problem: many outstanding bonds, namely, those issued under New
York law, do not have CACs. Therefore, even if new bonds included such
provisions, for a long time to come a large part of the stock of outstanding
bonds would not. Second, under traditional CACs the vote to start litiga-
tion or initiate a cramdown is taken bond issue by bond issue, rather than
by a majority of all bondholders together. Therefore holdout problems
and litigation problems may reemerge if a majority of holders of one or
more issues decide not to cooperate. Although one can imagine some kind
of super-CAC that would allow for a supermajority vote of all creditors in
a particular credit class (in this case, all bonds), such clauses do not exist
at present and are not likely to be introduced in a uniform way any time
soon. Third, although CACs could eventually be included in all bond
covenants, many other claims on the sovereign, such as bank loans, may
or may not have them. And over time ﬁnancial innovation may lead to the
creation of new ﬁnancial instruments that do not include such clauses.
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claims on the sovereign could be included in the same restructuring mech-
anism and be subject to the same overall majority vote. Fourth, achieving
uniformity in the wording and interpretation of CACs issued in very dif-
ferent legal jurisdictions may be very difﬁcult. Costly and protracted legal
issues of interpretation and adjudication may arise. A uniform interna-
tional bankruptcy regime would codify a standard set of rules and inter-
pretations. In short, although some of the difﬁculties with the contractual
approach could be overcome through the use of superclauses, arbitration,
and other inclusive mechanisms, such a beefed-up contractual approach
would end up being very close to a creditor-centered statutory approach.
Supporters of the status quo regime start from the observation that,
although either a statutory or a contractual approach could solve these
collective action problems and would therefore be welcome, several
thorny issues of political economy make them unlikely to emerge.7 If that
is the case, there is no alternative but to try to use the existing regime to
achieve orderly restructurings. In this regard, recent experience suggests
that bonded debt restructurings are feasible, even in the presence of hun-
dreds of thousands of heterogeneous creditors, through the use of unilat-
eral exchange offers (along with exit consents when available). Indeed,
such restructurings have already been successfully achieved in all four of
the recent episodes mentioned at the outset.
Moreover, the collective action problems that seem so intractable in
theory may be less serious in reality. First, a sovereign faced with a rush
to the exits can stop it by suspending its debt service unilaterally; this col-
lective action problem thus already has a solution under the current status
quo. Second, although such a suspension, in the absence of a stay of liti-
gation, may lead to a rush to the courthouse, that collective action prob-
lem is not as severe in the case of sovereign bankruptcy as it is in the
corporate bankruptcy context. In a corporate bankruptcy the stay of litiga-
tion is mostly about protecting creditors’ rights: its purpose is to avoid the
unfairness of some creditors attaching assets while others do not. In the
sovereign context, however, sovereign immunity implies that creditors
will have trouble ﬁnding any assets worth rushing to claim. Countries typ-
ically have few assets subject to the jurisdictions of foreign courts that
might be available for creditors to seize or attach. Creditors’ ability to
326 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
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ited. And, indeed, there is little evidence of a rush to litigate when a coun-
try suspends debt payments. In the recent case of Argentina, for example,
creditors have threatened litigation, but to date none has occurred.
If, under the current status quo, the rush to the exits already has a solu-
tion and the rush to the courthouse is not a serious issue, only the free
rider problem remains as a major collective action problem that might not
be easily solved in the absence of a majority cramdown provision. But
under the status quo, even the free rider problem (and the related litigation
threat) has not been a grievous one. There are plenty of good ways to
overcome or at least minimize the rogue creditor problem even without
majority cramdown clauses. Indeed, one can identify at least ten reasons
why the holdout problem is not an important one in practice.
First, as already noted, the unanimity problem that arises when bond
contracts do not have majority cramdown clauses can be bypassed
through the use of unilateral exchange offers. Although these offers do
not eliminate the holdout problem, they allow for a great majority of
cooperative bondholders to accept new bonds with new payment features
even when the old bond required unanimity to change its terms. In recent
cases involving thousands of bondholders (Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia,
Ukraine), such offers have had overwhelming success, with 99 percent or
more of creditors accepting the offer. 
Second, exit consents, which allow the nonﬁnancial terms of a bond
covenant to be changed by majority vote, have been successfully used (for
example, in Ecuador) to dilute the beneﬁts of being a holdout. 
Third, a combination of carrots and sticks can be (and has been) used
to dissuade holdouts and ensure the successful completion of deals. Car-
rots can include sweeteners in the form of cash, release of collateral, and
seniority upgrades. Sticks may include the threat of default, ex post use of
CACs, and exit consents.
Fourth, the free rider problem is predicated on the assumption that, in a
debt restructuring, a creditor who holds out receives more in the end than
creditors who do not. But this assumption is ﬂawed in a number of ways.
First, one cannot assume that holdouts automatically recover the full value
of their claims; a more reasonable assumption is that they will recover
something more than the current market value of their claim only after
lengthy, costly, and risky litigation. Moreover, under any market-based
exchange offer, any investor who marks his or her claim to the market
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as the value of the new claim at least equals the market value of the old
claim. And this is likely to be the case, because no creditor would will-
ingly accept an exchange offer that does not offer at least mark-to-market
neutrality. Indeed, in all previous debt exchanges, creditors have enjoyed
mark-to-market gains (20 to 30 percent on average); such gains increased
the likelihood that the offer would be accepted by a majority of creditors.
Fifth, a creditor may still decide to hold out from an offer that provides
mark-to-market neutrality or a mark-to-market gain, if the risk-adjusted
expected discounted net value of its original claim is greater, as a result of
holding out, than that of the new claim. But each of those adjectives—
“risk-adjusted,” “expected,” “discounted,” and “net”—is critical here.
Litigation is costly, especially for small creditors, and that affects the
“net” calculation. The outcome of litigation is uncertain, and that affects
the “expected.” Some creditors (small retail creditors, for example) are
more risk averse than others; that affects the risk adjustment. And some
creditors have a high rate of time preference and will want to avoid the
delay costs of protracted litigation; they will apply a higher discount rate.
Thus a majority of creditors are likely to accept an offer that is mark-to-
market neutral or slightly positive, rather than hold out and incur the
costs, risks, and delays of litigation.
Sixth, large ﬁnancial institutions that have valuable ongoing relations
with a sovereign debtor (through the franchise value of their commercial
banks in the debtor country or the fees and commissions on their debt
underwriting services) are unlikely to hold out and ﬁght. In fact, they may
take the lead in coordinating the actions of the other creditors, apply
moral suasion on holdouts, and, if necessary, bribe them into accepting a
deal. The desire to gain the large commissions involved in a successful
deal also leads these intermediaries to design workout packages that min-
imize such “deal risk.”
Seventh, the holdout problem can be minimized through side payments
(that is, the bribes mentioned just above) offered by creditors who have a
lot to gain from a successful deal, or by the debtor itself (by buying out a
limited number of holdouts after the deal has been struck), or by ofﬁcial
creditors (through additional ofﬁcial ﬁnance that provides enhancements
or sweeteners to a deal).
Eighth, the decision in the Elliott Associates case, described by White,
was from a legal standpoint highly controversial. The legal doctrine that
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creditors to stop payments to other creditors who have accepted an
exchange offer. The logic of this doctrine is likely to be successfully chal-
lenged in future court actions.
Ninth, creative variants of the regime of exchange offers can be
designed to provide orderly, market-based restructurings that reduce the
risks of litigation and free riding. A recent J. P. Morgan proposal describes
such mechanisms.8
Finally, rogue and vulture creditors are often part of the solution rather
than a problem. Vultures are low-risk-aversion speculators who buy low
after a default, when debt prices have collapsed, in the hope of getting
large mark-to-market gains from a successful deal; this may make them
more rather than less likely to accept an exchange offer rather than liti-
gate. For example, the same Elliott Associates that infamously and suc-
cessfully sued Peru also held some Ecuadorian debt, and in that case the
ﬁrm decided, along with more than 99 percent of Ecuador’s creditors, to
accept the exchange offer rather than hold out, because the offer provided
signiﬁcant mark-to-market gains. Moreover, even rogue creditors do not
jeopardize the completion of an exchange offer: their incentive to start lit-
igation is triggered by a successful offer, not a failed one. Only after a
majority of creditors have accepted a deal does a rogue have the incentive
to litigate and attempt to obtain a full claim.
Thus, although the free rider problem cannot be completely solved in
the absence of a majority cramdown clause, there are various creative
ways to minimize its risks and consequences within the current market-
based status quo. And, indeed, recent experience has shown that holdout
problems have not prevented the successful achievement of orderly
bonded debt restructurings. In most cases the status quo may still work
and allow successful exchange offers, with the holdout problem amount-
ing only to a minor nuisance after the deal.
Finally, the rush-to-default problem is of concern to those, like Bulow,
who worry about debtor moral hazard. In a world where countries beneﬁt
from sovereign immunity and creditors have very limited ability to attach
sovereign assets, a sovereign may opportunistically default; that is,
default may be driven by unwillingness to pay rather than inability to pay.
Thus a restructuring process that is too easy or too orderly (that is, one
Nouriel Roubini 329
8. Bartholomew, Liuzzi, and Stern (2002).
0675-08 BPEA/Roubini  7/22/02  1:12 PM  Page 329that imposes little cost on the debtor) may not be socially efﬁcient.
Indeed, the appropriate costs (in terms of lost access to international cap-
ital markets and reduced output and trade) that creditors can impose on
debtors are an important component of a well-balanced regime that mini-
mizes the moral hazard of opportunistic default. But just as a default that
is too easy may not be efﬁcient, so, too, can a disorderly default (triggered
by an inability to pay) impose losses that are socially inefﬁcient. All three
regimes discussed above would thus deal with the rush-to-default prob-
lem through reputational mechanisms and the various costs of an oppor-
tunistic default.
Bulow’s paper presents a radical view of debtor moral hazard and the
merits (or demerits) of an international bankruptcy regime. He sees debtor
moral hazard as a pervasive problem, from two perspectives. First, poli-
cymakers in emerging-market economies have a bias toward socially
inefﬁcient budget deﬁcits, because many of their policymakers are cor-
rupt and willing to borrow for inefﬁcient reasons. Second, the problem of
unwillingness (as opposed to inability) to pay is severe in these economies,
where the sovereign has a strong incentive to default opportunistically.
Thus Bulow believes that the way to reduce these countries’ deﬁcit bias is
to provide sovereigns full sovereign immunity rather than the partial
immunity that comes from issuing debt in the major ﬁnancial centers.
Sovereign debtors, Bulow argues, should be allowed to borrow only in
their own legal jurisdictions where sovereign immunity is close to full.
This reform could severely restrict the ability of sovereign debtors to bor-
row from international investors: only responsible sovereign policy-
makers following sound policies would be able to sell foreign investors
securities issued in the policymaker’s jurisdiction. In Bulow’s view, an
international bankruptcy court is a second-best approach which, by mak-
ing it easier for a sovereign to default and restructure its debts, would
severely shrink the amount of international capital lending to emerging-
market sovereign debtors, an outcome that he ﬁnds to be socially efﬁcient.
I am not convinced by Bulow’s arguments, for a number of reasons.
First, reputational mechanisms and the costs of default in terms of forgone
trade and output do signiﬁcantly restrict the willingness even of corrupt
policymakers to default. Governments try to avoid a default as much as
possible, and for as long as possible, because default is politically,
socially, and economically costly. Second, the empirical evidence on
moral hazard in international lending is extremely thin; for example,
330 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2002
0675-08 BPEA/Roubini  7/22/02  1:12 PM  Page 330Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer show that domestic taxpayers,
rather than the IMF (that is, international taxpayers) or creditors, pay the
costs of ofﬁcial support packages.9 In particular, IMF support is not a
debtor bailout—that is, a grant—but rather an unsubsidized loan. Thus the
idea that countries would deliberately follow policies that lead to currency
and ﬁnancial crises, in expectation of a bailout, is not supported by the
evidence. 
Third, a side implication of the point that IMF support is not a debtor
bailout but an unsubsidized loan is that Bulow’s aversion to lending by
the international ﬁnancial institutions does not have a strong empirical
basis. Also, there are many arguments in favor of IMF loans and condi-
tionality and against the “aid, not loans” view. Even Sachs’ views on the
issue of IMF loans appear to have changed. In his 1995 paper he argued
that, rather than organize large bailout packages, the international com-
munity could address liquidity runs by turning the IMF into an interna-
tional bankruptcy court, with the power to restructure sovereign debts.10
But his later analysis of the Asian crisis as being driven mostly by self-
fulﬁlling liquidity runs returns to the notion that large IMF packages are
necessary to deal with destructive liquidity runs. Also, dealing with
liquidity crises through standstills and debt workouts could itself be seri-
ously destabilizing. As I have discussed elsewhere,11 in a world character-
ized by uncertainty, risk aversion, and imperfect policy credibility,
expectations of an imminent standstill may trigger an early and destruc-
tive “rush to the exits” that would have serious consequences even if all
international ﬁnancial transactions were subject to the standstill. Thus, at
least for the cases that most closely resemble illiquidity runs, there is a
consensus that IMF loans, rather than standstills, are the solution. 
Fourth, as long as the ability of the private sector to borrow interna-
tionally is not restricted, such restrictions on a sovereign will affect nei-
ther its ability to accumulate debt nor its cost of doing so: the sovereign
will borrow at home, and the private sector will in turn borrow abroad to
finance its own lending to the sovereign. For example, in many recent
crises (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Turkey) a large fraction of
government debt was issued domestically and purchased by domestic
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from investors abroad, who thus financed the government’s budget needs
indirectly.
Fifth, although it is conceptually obvious that the existence of a third
player providing funds, whether it be the IMF or another ofﬁcial entity,
may lead to a delay game between the debtor and its creditors aimed at
extracting further ofﬁcial resources, the empirical relevance of this prob-
lem is small. Because the subsidy component of IMF loans is small,12 and
because IMF loans are senior to private claims, such gaming would be
beneﬁcial neither to the debtor nor to the private creditors. 
Sixth, an international bankruptcy court, as proposed by the IMF,
would not provide new powers to the IMF or to the debtor relative to the
current status quo or to a contractual regime. Thus it would not affect
debtors’ incentives to default, and therefore it would not severely reduce
the amount of lending to governments of emerging-market economies. In
summary, Bulow’s concerns about the evils of sovereign borrowing and
of IMF lending do not seem warranted by the facts. And his solution to
these alleged problems would not solve the distortions that it is meant to
address.
In conclusion, the debate over which of the proposed restructuring
regimes would be best at achieving orderly restructurings is still open: all
three regimes provide different solutions to the collective action problems
inherent in debt restructurings. The statutory approach offers a clean and
consistent way of solving collective action problems, but it is unlikely to
be implemented in the near future. Similarly, the contractual approach is
appealing, but transition problems and the lack of incentives to implement
it may be insurmountable. Thus, for the time being, working with the sta-
tus quo remains the dominant option. There is a strong case for believing
that the current market-based regime can minimize collective action prob-
lems and provide for orderly restructurings.
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